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Unatoč ovim problemima, knjiga Galileo’s Error: Foundations for 
a New Science of Consciousness poticajno je štivo vrijedno čitanja. Zbog 
jasnoće stila i neakademskog karaktera, knjigu bih svakako preporučio 
čitateljima koji do sada nisu imali doticaja s ozbiljnim znanstvenim i fi-
lozofskim tekstovima. Također, zahvaljujući provokativnim prijedlozima 




Ted Nannicelli, Artistic Creation and Ethical Criticism (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 288 pp.
Ted Nannicelli has already established himself as an aesthetician who 
pushes the boundaries of philosophical exploration of art and art-related 
practices. Having developed a framework for a philosophical approach 
to television aesthetics in his previous work, in his new monograph he 
turns to the ethical criticism of art. His main concern is to establish the 
legitimacy of what he calls the production-oriented approach (hereafter 
POA), which is based on the premise that, when it comes to the ethical 
criticism of art, certain artworks should be evaluated from the standpoint 
of their production. In other words, it is the “medium of the artwork 
that is partly determinative of the sorts of ethical criticism to which it 
is open” (p. 72). Thus, what matters with photography, performance art, 
stand-up comedy, and environmental and animal art is not the perspec-
tive expressed by the work but the circumstances of its production. Most 
relevant among these is the moral character of the maker: when it figures 
into a causal explanation of the form or content (i.e., the identity) of 
the particular work, then the work’s artistic value can be marred by an 
ethically flawed character.
With its emphasis on production circumstances, the POA is advan-
ced as an alternative to what Nannicelli perceives as a philosophically 
more dominant form of ethical art criticism, namely the Gaut/Kieran/
Carroll-inspired perspectivism (P hereafter), itself a variant of the in-
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terpretation-centered approach. According to P, an artwork is ethically 
evaluated according to the attitude or perspective advanced by the work. 
This approach is grounded in two debates dominant in contemporary 
philosophy of art: aesthetic cognitivism (AC) and the value-interaction 
debate (VID). According to AC, art is a source of knowledge, and one 
can learn something from it by attending to what it expresses. The VID 
centers on the conceptual issues regarding the mutual influence of the 
ethical and aesthetic dimensions in a work of art: does, can, or should 
an ethical flaw in the work (i.e., a morally blameworthy perspective that 
the work advances) mar the work’s overall aesthetic/artistic value? 
Both AC and the VID face certain issues, and the first part of the 
book is dedicated to exposing them. As Nannicelli points out, ethical 
criticism based on P is a “philosophers’ only” game, which neither reaches 
a wider audience nor has any effect in the social/legal/political domain 
in which art evaluation matters. This is because it is hard to show that 
there in fact is a morally relevant impact of artwork on the audience, 
whether in terms of moral improvement or in terms of moral degrada-
tion. Nannicelli pointedly presents difficulties involved with empirical 
research on art’s alleged influence on spectators’ moral sensibility and 
overall behavior. These range from difficulties of designing the experi-
ments to those regarding the techniques to measure the actual impact. A 
second reason for P’s exclusion from the public space relates to theoretical 
difficulties underlying it: in order to claim that a certain work presents 
a certain perspective, one first needs to properly identify that perspec-
tive, which, in turn, implies that there are no competing interpretations 
of the work. Yet, as art lovers know too well, there is never a consensus 
on any interpretation. Furthermore, to support some such interpreta-
tion, we should know the author’s intentions, which we rarely do. So, 
Nannicelli concludes (after much insightful discussion of the nature of 
interpretation and intentionalism/anti-intentionalism debate) there are 
no good reasons to assume that we can ever justifiably claim that a work 
advances a certain perspective.
Having thus exposed the troubles with P, Nannicelli turns to defend 
the POA. A crucial theoretical advantage of the POA is its alignment 
with our folk-critical practice regarding ethical evaluations generally: it 
assigns moral responsibility to artists, which is what we want our ethi-
cal criticism to do. Given that artworks are the products of intentional 
activities, their ethical assessments should take into consideration those 
who made them, which P cannot achieve. There are two theoretical claims 
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underlying the POA: virtue ethics, which attaches the moral value of the 
action to the character of the person performing the action, and con-
textualism, which sees the identity of a work of art as dependent on the 
context of the artistic creation. The challenge for Nannicelli is establishing 
the role of the artist’s characters within that context, primarily in cases 
where the contexts of art creation and art evaluation differ. As he sees 
it, much more research, including research incorporating anthropology, 
moral psychology, and history, might be needed here.
In the second part, Nannicelli demonstrates the application of the 
POA. The five chapters dedicated to concrete instances and Nannicelli’s 
analysis of them are an impressive body of work, highly enjoyable and 
thought-provoking. Nannicelli examines a remarkable array of cases, 
extending from photography (e.g., works by Hampus Lundgren and 
Sebastião Salgado) to animal (e.g., Dogs that Cannot Touch Each Other) 
and environmental art (Endangered Garden), to Marina Abramović and 
Suzanne Lacy’s performances and stand-up gigs by Anthony Jeselnik, 
Dave Chappelle and Louis C. K. This part is extremely informative in 
giving context to the complexities involved in ethical criticism of art, and 
Nannicelli is to be commended for providing such a substantial analysis 
of these issues, ranging from photo-journalism to issues of child consent, 
word meaning, responsibility, etc. We also find pointers here on where 
not enough work has been done, as in Nannicelli’s directing attention 
to the lack of critical discussion regarding animals in contemporary art 
within the art institution. The chapter on environmental art is particu-
larly relevant for strengthening the ethics of the environment. Given 
the current issues with climate change, Nannicelli’s manner of raising 
awareness of these issues is an immensely praiseworthy achievement.
Throughout this part, the author juxtaposes P and the POA and 
builds up a case for what, in conclusion, he calls applied ethics of artistic 
creation. While P can be valuable (primarily when narrative and repre-
sentational art is concerned), Nannicelli insists that the POA is more 
attuned to popular criticism, and, more importantly, it “is more likely 
to result in real-world consequences” (p. 246) related to legal sanctions 
issued to the artists. 
There is much to recommend in Nannicelli’s book. We are sure it will 
open new pathways not only for aestheticians but, more importantly, for 
the public perception of art and its ethical dimension. Given the highly 
complex philosophical machinery that Nannicelli relies upon (e.g., speech 
act theory in his analysis of stand-up comedy), some might doubt how 
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approachable the book is outside philosophy. Regardless, the book will 
hopefully inspire conversation on the necessity of political treatments of 
morally problematic works of art, as it offers compelling reasons for public 
policymakers to acknowledge why the issues of art production matter.
On the theoretical side, perspectivists are likely to strike back. 
For one, Nannicelli argues that the plurality of opinions concerning 
an author’s intentions is problematic in the case of P, since there is no 
consensus on the author’s intentions and the work’s true meaning. And 
while he acknowledges that a similar problem might arise with respect 
to the artist’s character, he does not think it has the same bearing on the 
POA and insists that the POA’s “objectivity is less contested” (p. 246). We 
doubt, however, if that is so. Disagreements regarding the (im)morality 
of an artist’s character and its contribution to the ethical dimension of 
a work are just as persistent as disagreement regarding the intentions, 
as revealed by Nannicelli’s analysis. The worry is all the more pressing 
given the public sanctions that Nannicelli wants the POA to deliver.
Furthermore, it is questionable whether Nannicelli’s final verdict 
regarding the importance of character gets him as far as he sets out to 
go. “If the artists’ moral behavior is not part of the generative context, or, 
is part of that context but still has no causal role in shaping the artisti-
cally relevant properties of the work, then it does not legitimately bear 
upon our ethical appraisal of that particular work” (p. 249), Nannicelli 
concludes, thus allowing for the possibility of morally blameworthy 
people doing fine art and not being held accountable. Works may well 
be created by bad people who happen not to be bad at the time of pro-
duction of a certain piece, and the crucial philosophical issue is to see 
whether such cases should be exempt from moral blame. If this were an 
acceptable principle, one of the greatest designers ever, John Galliano, 
should not be held accountable for his anti-semitic outburst in a Paris 
restaurant, given that he was not creating any of his masterpiece collec-
tions at the time. Nannicelli’s answer in such cases is to separate ethical 
criticism and artistic appreciation: one can choose to avoid works by 
morally problematic artists, as long as one is aware that such a choice 
is an ethical one based on personal preference, rather than a judgment 
of artistic value (p. 248). This is an important distinction, but acknowl-
edging this solution greatly diminishes the ambition of the project: that 
of explaining the contribution of production to a work’s artistic value.
Certainly, one of the most interesting aspects of the book is its 
willingness to address the contemporary controversy regarding the 
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aftermath of the Me Too movement. Nannicelli subjects himself to the 
challenging task of giving us a way to think of such artistically wonderful 
performances as those by Kevin Spacey in the knowledge of his moral 
transgressions. Indeed, for many people, this is still rather controversial, 
and what this book does – and does well, we think – is to offer pointers 
on how to engage with such issues without either rejecting the artistically 
valuable artworks or failing to acknowledge (implicitly at least) the moral 
harm committed by such performers. Needless to say, however, it is hard 
to expect that everyone will agree with Nannicelli, and much will depend 
on individual intuitions regarding these cases. To begin with, one may 
wonder how far ethical criticism should generally extend. Nannicelli’s 
examples (of both real and imaginary cases) pinpoint why this is such 
a tricky question. If we hold artists responsible for what they do in the 
course of creating their art, should we do the same when it comes to 
the moral character of philosophers and other scientists? They too are 
not immune to the charges (and urges!) of sexual misconduct, and while 
it may be harder to show that a certain philosophical paper was writ-
ten in morally reprehensible circumstances, the fact that certain highly 
respected philosophers have had their university status revoked shows 
that the character may matter more than Nannicelli claims. But, on the 
other hand, how far is too far or far enough? Should we also hold artists 
accountable for the topics they opt for and turn their artistic choices 
into a moral issue, as writer Aminatta Forna wonders (cf. https://lithub.
com/where-are-the-wests-political-novelists/)?
Furthermore, should the questions of the ethics of production be 
extended beyond the context of art? Should we boycott different manu-
facturers for their apparently unethical treatment of animals (in research 
and fashion) or people – think of exploitation of children or manual labor 
workers all over the world who can barely manage to survive a month 
on their salary. While Nannicelli is to be praised for the ethical values 
we want social agents to possess, our social and political reality may be 
too messy for such a virtuous model.
However, Nannicelli is modest in his intentions, stating in conclusion 
that much more is needed for this project to get off the ground. For one, 
he sees metaethical issues as the most pressing: whether a certain work is 
morally marred depends on what is considered morally blameworthy. So 
far so good, but the trouble is, Nannicelli asks, how are we to determine 
that? By examining the (accepted morality of the) context of creation? 
Or the context of evaluation? Lacking such responses, the author con-
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cludes, all we can do is not lose focus on the importance of what we as 
philosophers are doing and stay committed to further research. For sure, 
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